Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Thursday, February 24, 2011
Review
Let's take a moment to review my writing process so far and determine what's holding it back from being more efficient.
1) Not updating daily. Make it an absolute that tonight you will type up on the blog the material you've written for the day. Today that will consist of a revised introduction and continued work on your articulation of DeLanda's solution to the problem of the genesis of individuals, and, if possible, your articulation of D&G's solution to the problem of the genesis of strata or territorialities.
2) Spending too much time writing outlines of the material without writing material on the material.
3) Taking days off for being sick, requiring a day of catch-up to refresh the memory of the material once held firmly in mind.
So, I'll stop getting sick and start writing before or as I outline the section I'm writing on, or outline only with a mind to the problem I'm right then taking on.
1) Not updating daily. Make it an absolute that tonight you will type up on the blog the material you've written for the day. Today that will consist of a revised introduction and continued work on your articulation of DeLanda's solution to the problem of the genesis of individuals, and, if possible, your articulation of D&G's solution to the problem of the genesis of strata or territorialities.
2) Spending too much time writing outlines of the material without writing material on the material.
3) Taking days off for being sick, requiring a day of catch-up to refresh the memory of the material once held firmly in mind.
So, I'll stop getting sick and start writing before or as I outline the section I'm writing on, or outline only with a mind to the problem I'm right then taking on.
What I Wrote Yesterday
Yesterday I finally began a practice which I aspire to keep with me a long time: that of writing on paper for extended periods of time, daily.
I'd done it before when arranging my hours or drafting poems, but not yet in writing research.
I'm attracted to the practice for several reasons: 1) the great writers of the past, when great writers were widely recognized as great, wrote with pen and paper, with the rhythms of a single hand, or else with a typewriter, or with some combination of the two practices, and I'd be a moron to not at least attempt to emulate the great writers of the past over any current schmuck typing on a computer (my favorite setup being that of the pen and paper during the day, typing late into the night, a daily combo I take from my adolescent writer hero who I admired, as is often the case for such age, for little interesting reason, Paul Auster), 2) it forces you to put more concentrated muscle into what you're doing, and to pay attention to the movements of your thought, to recognize writing for the self-punishing, attention-draining practice that it is, 3) it literally makes legible the way in which your personality, your bodily constitution and the way in which the world's affections (not in the romantic but in the Spinozist sense, as that of emotions with exterior origin) influence the quality of your activity, as indicated by the rhythm and tempo, the intensity of pressure, and the fineness or cruddiness of form in the handwriting, 4) it avoids all the averse effects the computer and the internet have on one's capacity for single-pointed attention, for being "too wired to concentrate" or subject to "continuous continuous partial attention" (see <http://k-punk.abstractdynamics.org/archives/011659.html> for a rundown of how widespread neverending digital interpassivity affects our very brain receptors everyday), and 5) it demands I restrict myself to what I know off the top of my head or can grasp with the material text at hand, rather than what I can look up on the internet in twenty seconds.
Here's what I wrote yesterday (typed out a day late due to exhaustion and MoA reading the day before). I should be complete except for citation:
I will begin the task of detailing DeLanda's proposed solution to the problem of the genesis of spatiotemporal form by first describing his account of the virtual's basic structure, consisting as it does of complex elements derived from formal theories (that is, theories which generate experiments) in the advanced mathematics and sciences.
The virtual, which I will here define as that dimension out of which intensive processes drive the progressive differentiation of forms that populate the actual, consists of three main elements: the plane of consistency, multiplicities, and quasi-causal operators. We will see later that in "The Geology of Morals" these elements are termed the Body without Organs, rhizomes (?), and epistrata. The concept most essential to understanding Deleuze's solution to the problem of the genesis of spatiotemporal form is that of multiplicity. To understand the concept I will need to provide some background information in differential geometry, group theory, and dynamical systems theory.
The term "multiplicity" is closely related to that of "manifold," a term designating a geometrical space with certain characteristic properties. Some history of differential geometry will help us grasp the particularities of manifolds, especially those which enable the concept to go beyond the resources offered by essentialist explanations for the genesis of form. The term derives from the differential geometry of Friedrich Gauss and Bernhard Riemann. Differential geometry can first be understood through its distinction with regard to analytical geometry. Analytical geometry, invented by René Descartes and Pierre de Fermat, consists of the "now familiar method of embedding curves into a tw0-dimensional space on which arbitrary axes could be fixed" (DeLanda 11). This embedding of fixed axes allowed the assignment of a pair of numbers (coordinates) to every point on the curve, making it so that the geometric relations between points could be expressed as relations between numbers, a task for which the newly developed algebra was perfectly suited. In short, a translation scheme was invented that allowed the combinatorial resources of algebra to be employed toward the solution of geometrical problems. The basic inspiration behind differential geometry is congruent: tapping into a new reservoir of problem-solving resources--this time not algebra, but differential and integral calculus. In particular, problems involving the relations between the changes of two or more quantities became the original application for the calculus, it being a way of find the instantaneous value for the rate of change (relations between changes) of two or more quantities.
When Gauss began to tap into these differential resources offered by the calculus, a curved two-dimensional space was studied using the Cartesian method: again, with the surface embedded in a three-dimensional space complete with its own fixed set of axes, coordinates assigned to every point of the surface, and geometric links between points determining the form of the surface exposed and algebraic relations between the numbers. But Gauss realized that the calculus operated entirely with local information, focusing on infinitesimal points on the surface itself, thus allowed the study of the surface without any reference to a global embedding space. He developed a method to implant the coordinate axes on the surface itself and use differential rather than algebraic equations to characterize their relations. As Morris Klein observes, Gauss advanced the new concept that "a surface is a space in itself" (cite).
It would be Riemann who would develop the resources necessary to think the term originally referred to as "manifold." He extended the study of the surface as a space in itself from the two-dimensional case Gauss had dealt with to that of N-dimensional spaces, thus developing the concept of the "manifold," and N-dimensional curved structure defined exclusively through its intrinsic features--that is, defined without the need to embed them into a higher-dimensional (N+1) space. We could define a multiplicity similarly: "Multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system," which "however many dimensions it may have... never has a supplementary dimension to that which transpires upon it. This alone makes it natural and immanent" (Deleuze in DeLanda, 12). In this way they oppose the concept of essence, which supposes both a defining unity and a transcendent space in which they are embedded. Though it may be objected that these are purely formal differences between concepts, in the following paragraphs I will specify the way in which multiplicities relate to the physical processes which generate material objects, thus showing how these formal differences indicate deeper ontological differences. Along the way I will of course eventually articulate the other two main elements of the virtual, as they become necessary to our understanding of the genesis of form.
I'd done it before when arranging my hours or drafting poems, but not yet in writing research.
I'm attracted to the practice for several reasons: 1) the great writers of the past, when great writers were widely recognized as great, wrote with pen and paper, with the rhythms of a single hand, or else with a typewriter, or with some combination of the two practices, and I'd be a moron to not at least attempt to emulate the great writers of the past over any current schmuck typing on a computer (my favorite setup being that of the pen and paper during the day, typing late into the night, a daily combo I take from my adolescent writer hero who I admired, as is often the case for such age, for little interesting reason, Paul Auster), 2) it forces you to put more concentrated muscle into what you're doing, and to pay attention to the movements of your thought, to recognize writing for the self-punishing, attention-draining practice that it is, 3) it literally makes legible the way in which your personality, your bodily constitution and the way in which the world's affections (not in the romantic but in the Spinozist sense, as that of emotions with exterior origin) influence the quality of your activity, as indicated by the rhythm and tempo, the intensity of pressure, and the fineness or cruddiness of form in the handwriting, 4) it avoids all the averse effects the computer and the internet have on one's capacity for single-pointed attention, for being "too wired to concentrate" or subject to "continuous continuous partial attention" (see <http://k-punk.abstractdynamics.org/archives/011659.html> for a rundown of how widespread neverending digital interpassivity affects our very brain receptors everyday), and 5) it demands I restrict myself to what I know off the top of my head or can grasp with the material text at hand, rather than what I can look up on the internet in twenty seconds.
Here's what I wrote yesterday (typed out a day late due to exhaustion and MoA reading the day before). I should be complete except for citation:
I will begin the task of detailing DeLanda's proposed solution to the problem of the genesis of spatiotemporal form by first describing his account of the virtual's basic structure, consisting as it does of complex elements derived from formal theories (that is, theories which generate experiments) in the advanced mathematics and sciences.
The virtual, which I will here define as that dimension out of which intensive processes drive the progressive differentiation of forms that populate the actual, consists of three main elements: the plane of consistency, multiplicities, and quasi-causal operators. We will see later that in "The Geology of Morals" these elements are termed the Body without Organs, rhizomes (?), and epistrata. The concept most essential to understanding Deleuze's solution to the problem of the genesis of spatiotemporal form is that of multiplicity. To understand the concept I will need to provide some background information in differential geometry, group theory, and dynamical systems theory.
The term "multiplicity" is closely related to that of "manifold," a term designating a geometrical space with certain characteristic properties. Some history of differential geometry will help us grasp the particularities of manifolds, especially those which enable the concept to go beyond the resources offered by essentialist explanations for the genesis of form. The term derives from the differential geometry of Friedrich Gauss and Bernhard Riemann. Differential geometry can first be understood through its distinction with regard to analytical geometry. Analytical geometry, invented by René Descartes and Pierre de Fermat, consists of the "now familiar method of embedding curves into a tw0-dimensional space on which arbitrary axes could be fixed" (DeLanda 11). This embedding of fixed axes allowed the assignment of a pair of numbers (coordinates) to every point on the curve, making it so that the geometric relations between points could be expressed as relations between numbers, a task for which the newly developed algebra was perfectly suited. In short, a translation scheme was invented that allowed the combinatorial resources of algebra to be employed toward the solution of geometrical problems. The basic inspiration behind differential geometry is congruent: tapping into a new reservoir of problem-solving resources--this time not algebra, but differential and integral calculus. In particular, problems involving the relations between the changes of two or more quantities became the original application for the calculus, it being a way of find the instantaneous value for the rate of change (relations between changes) of two or more quantities.
When Gauss began to tap into these differential resources offered by the calculus, a curved two-dimensional space was studied using the Cartesian method: again, with the surface embedded in a three-dimensional space complete with its own fixed set of axes, coordinates assigned to every point of the surface, and geometric links between points determining the form of the surface exposed and algebraic relations between the numbers. But Gauss realized that the calculus operated entirely with local information, focusing on infinitesimal points on the surface itself, thus allowed the study of the surface without any reference to a global embedding space. He developed a method to implant the coordinate axes on the surface itself and use differential rather than algebraic equations to characterize their relations. As Morris Klein observes, Gauss advanced the new concept that "a surface is a space in itself" (cite).
It would be Riemann who would develop the resources necessary to think the term originally referred to as "manifold." He extended the study of the surface as a space in itself from the two-dimensional case Gauss had dealt with to that of N-dimensional spaces, thus developing the concept of the "manifold," and N-dimensional curved structure defined exclusively through its intrinsic features--that is, defined without the need to embed them into a higher-dimensional (N+1) space. We could define a multiplicity similarly: "Multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many and the one, but rather an organization belonging to the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system," which "however many dimensions it may have... never has a supplementary dimension to that which transpires upon it. This alone makes it natural and immanent" (Deleuze in DeLanda, 12). In this way they oppose the concept of essence, which supposes both a defining unity and a transcendent space in which they are embedded. Though it may be objected that these are purely formal differences between concepts, in the following paragraphs I will specify the way in which multiplicities relate to the physical processes which generate material objects, thus showing how these formal differences indicate deeper ontological differences. Along the way I will of course eventually articulate the other two main elements of the virtual, as they become necessary to our understanding of the genesis of form.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Been Busy Writing on Legal Pads
And getting really sick.
Will resume updating this week, though perhaps not tonight.
Will resume updating this week, though perhaps not tonight.
Finished All My Notes
Now I'm going to see if I can write the entire thing before I collapse from need of sleep. That way I'll be done with everything but revision before my interview w/ Omnidawn on Thursday.
Sunday, February 13, 2011
What the Problems Are
1. Nietzsche - genesis of values (minimally buttressed by an argument about the genesis of individuals--there is no atom which exists distinct from the forces that compose it, no good or noble person that can withhold from acting in a good or noble fashion)
2. Deleuze on Nietzsche - genesis of values and genesis of objects or forces (will-to-power as differentiator of forces)
3. DeLanda - genesis of individuals
4. Deleuze & Guattari - genesis of strata or territorialities (organisms)
5. Foucault - genesis of values of traditional historian
Me - genesis of each individual problem-solution set, and how this accounts for the transformations and appropriations of a theoretical entity called genealogy
Note: those scholars complaining against Foucault and Deleuze, who seem to be the target of this essay, operate with a misunderstanding of the problems dealt with, a misunderstanding of what counts as relevant and what counts as irrelevant, seeing only the actual text and calling for exhaustive exegesis about the text, they complain against Foucault and Deleuze for not simply repeating as they do, charging them with (gasp!) illicit scholarly method, but would they but attempt to penetrate beyond Nietzsche's words to see the incompleteness of his solutions, they would see how Deleuze has been all along attempting imperfect solutions to a genuinely philosophical problem Nietzsche had himself engaged with and recognized as beyond his anti-philosophical moral critiques: that of the genesis of forces or forms, that which accounts for the very constitution of the universe in all its difference.
So, the basic task of this thesis seems to be in demonstrating an adequate understanding of Deleuze's ontological speculation so as to show some learned fools in universities (should they ever happen across this little essay) they ain't go no ideas, only lots of references, a job, and a lot of undue resentment against a seriously great philosopher with more rigor to his thought than they have.
This could, however, lead to a much more interesting project: that of trying to understand what accounts for all the specific differences in Deleuze's models for the genesis of form; and, assuming it to be true that he felt none of them to be sufficient solutions to the problem, how might these transformations point us toward a new solution to the problem of genesis? Perhaps Miguel de Beistegui has something to say toward this in his book Truth and Genesis, though probably some of the Speculative Realists or Object-Oriented Ontologists so hot these days have more interesting models to propose, since Beistegui's book looks more an exegetical than speculative affair.
2. Deleuze on Nietzsche - genesis of values and genesis of objects or forces (will-to-power as differentiator of forces)
3. DeLanda - genesis of individuals
4. Deleuze & Guattari - genesis of strata or territorialities (organisms)
5. Foucault - genesis of values of traditional historian
Me - genesis of each individual problem-solution set, and how this accounts for the transformations and appropriations of a theoretical entity called genealogy
Note: those scholars complaining against Foucault and Deleuze, who seem to be the target of this essay, operate with a misunderstanding of the problems dealt with, a misunderstanding of what counts as relevant and what counts as irrelevant, seeing only the actual text and calling for exhaustive exegesis about the text, they complain against Foucault and Deleuze for not simply repeating as they do, charging them with (gasp!) illicit scholarly method, but would they but attempt to penetrate beyond Nietzsche's words to see the incompleteness of his solutions, they would see how Deleuze has been all along attempting imperfect solutions to a genuinely philosophical problem Nietzsche had himself engaged with and recognized as beyond his anti-philosophical moral critiques: that of the genesis of forces or forms, that which accounts for the very constitution of the universe in all its difference.
So, the basic task of this thesis seems to be in demonstrating an adequate understanding of Deleuze's ontological speculation so as to show some learned fools in universities (should they ever happen across this little essay) they ain't go no ideas, only lots of references, a job, and a lot of undue resentment against a seriously great philosopher with more rigor to his thought than they have.
This could, however, lead to a much more interesting project: that of trying to understand what accounts for all the specific differences in Deleuze's models for the genesis of form; and, assuming it to be true that he felt none of them to be sufficient solutions to the problem, how might these transformations point us toward a new solution to the problem of genesis? Perhaps Miguel de Beistegui has something to say toward this in his book Truth and Genesis, though probably some of the Speculative Realists or Object-Oriented Ontologists so hot these days have more interesting models to propose, since Beistegui's book looks more an exegetical than speculative affair.
Saturday, February 12, 2011
Agh!
I've ended up finishing the entirety of Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, finding it necessary to read not only the third but the fourth section, given that this section explained the way in which Deleuze's ontology of the virtual (rather than one restricted to the actual) entails an epistemology of the problematic (rather than one restricted to laws). The way in which I've organized the overall aim of my thesis, that of determining whether and how each way of conceiving (and performing) a genealogy or some genetic story indicates a different conception of the problem of genesis, compels me to have a fully adequate grasp of the basics of Deleuze's problematic epistemology. Certainly I'll need to take further notes and review the material, but I'm already very excited: with this material learned and a full draft of the comparison b/w DeLanda and Deleuze, I'll be well on my way to deliver the final blows and type that shit out.
As expected, this puts me quite a ways behind regarding my other tasks, those of compiling an inventory of substantial and rhetorical differences and writing them out in well-formed, though only draft-quality, paragraphs...
I suppose in fact I'll need to copy out some of the most important passages from these sections before I move on to typing out the material for the comparative analysis, though I suppose there's no harm at least in typing up on here the differences as I've already noted them, without a full reading of DeLanda and without citing the differences to actual text. I'll do that right before I move on to reviewing and organizing the material on spatiotemporal actualization and problematic epistemology.
As expected, this puts me quite a ways behind regarding my other tasks, those of compiling an inventory of substantial and rhetorical differences and writing them out in well-formed, though only draft-quality, paragraphs...
I suppose in fact I'll need to copy out some of the most important passages from these sections before I move on to typing out the material for the comparative analysis, though I suppose there's no harm at least in typing up on here the differences as I've already noted them, without a full reading of DeLanda and without citing the differences to actual text. I'll do that right before I move on to reviewing and organizing the material on spatiotemporal actualization and problematic epistemology.
Work Due Saturday, 2/12
Each step should be directed toward the aim of completing your sections on D&G and DeLanda by the end of Sunday night, in preparation for your presentation to Prof. Mascuch, consisting of a minimum of 25 professionally written pages and a short explanation of what you've been up to and what you'll be doing to finish the entire thing.
1. Review and outline in brief the actualization of time in DeLanda, since you cannot sincerely attempt to compare his account of the genesis of form if your knowledge is restricted to the genesis of spatial form. Actual form is spatio-temporal, and it would be an injustice to compare his account of genesis with Deleuze and Guattari's without including anything from that large third section of the book, however disparate from the Deleuze & Guattari it seems (given that they never mention temporal form explicitly).
2. Cite and order all the minor differences and large structural disparities between Deleuze & Guattari and DeLanda's account of genesis, both in terms of substance and in terms of presentation. You'll have to present an ordered arrangement of evidence in your writing, so the more you prepare for the time of writing through preparatory organization the easier it will flow, the more streamlined your organization will be.
3. Once you have textual citations ordered in terms of conceptual priority, outline quickly into body paragraphs an exhaustive comparison with suggestions as to what each difference, taken singly and together, indicate about how the different authors' understandings of the philosophical problem to be solved differ, and what significance that difference has--i.e. what understanding of genesis it generates, who is to acquire such an understanding, and what might be further done with it.
4. But don't spend too much time outlining, for the important thing to accomplish today is to write these differences out, get them in sentence structure, make your conjectures about what they indicate about the problem engaged, and determine to what extent your schema might be appropriate.
5. Make a separate document saying everything you can find about what a philosophical problem is and how we can determine it. You might have to do extra research, seeking out Deleuze's interviews and indexical citations in his books that show him talking about what a problem is for philosophy.
6. Revise and organize the comparative analysis in order of priority and, to the extent applicable, according to your overall schema.
7. Prepare a plan for what you'll do tomorrow in order to either finish detailing the relevant aspects of each account of genesis separately, or finish the comparative analysis by ensuring that it not only sketches the important differences between the two accounts of genesis but also gives a faithful analysis of each account of genesis overall.
Finish all this by 7:00 p.m. Start the construction of your yearly calendar and reading of Stein immediately afterward. Remember that you are also responsible for completing a painting before you free yourself for anything else.
Friday, February 11, 2011
Work Due by 10 p.m. Today
1. Finish section on time in DeLanda: Outline quickly main points.
2. Outline in book "The Geology of Morals." Mark every detail, both rhetorical and substantial, that makes a difference between D&G's conception of the genesis of form and DeLanda's.
3. Conversely, review DeLanda's description of actualization and note any additional differences.
4. Prepare 2-5 pp. of body paragraphs comparing D&G and DeLanda, thinking, if possible, in the terms you've outlined in your schema--transcendence and immanence, metaphorical and literal, critical and speculative, origin or no origin and the way they relate to it, and, finally, how can they be seen as responding to a thoroughly determined problem.
2. Outline in book "The Geology of Morals." Mark every detail, both rhetorical and substantial, that makes a difference between D&G's conception of the genesis of form and DeLanda's.
3. Conversely, review DeLanda's description of actualization and note any additional differences.
4. Prepare 2-5 pp. of body paragraphs comparing D&G and DeLanda, thinking, if possible, in the terms you've outlined in your schema--transcendence and immanence, metaphorical and literal, critical and speculative, origin or no origin and the way they relate to it, and, finally, how can they be seen as responding to a thoroughly determined problem.
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Been Outlining "The Geology of Morals" Today
Luckily, John Protevi's already done it for me, so I've been copying by hand and reviewing his very thorough outline for the past three hours:
Major divisions of the plateau:
Framing narrative:
Professor Challenger's lecture, mixing geology and biology according to his simian disposition (40a). Denounced by the audience; Challenger's discipline named; Challenger introduces terminology of his friend Hjelmslev (42b). Challenger admits digression, but no way to distinguish digressive and nondigressive (49a). Most of the audience had left by end of second section. Challenger had changed: dreaming of program for computers, an axiomatic for stratification; addresses himself to memory only (57a). Challenger rushed by line of time on third (human) stratum (63a). Challenger wants to go faster and faster; but no one left. Challenger deterritorializing on the spot (64b). Challenger finishing up; suffocating; pincers; oozing fluid; animal voice (72). Flight of Challenger: leaving for the plane of consistency. Panic is creation (73a).
A General Theory of Stratification (40a-45) I. Elementary terminology (40a-40c) A. BwO and Strata (40a) 1. Earth = BwO [= plane of consistency] [=limit of deterritorialization of all strata] a. unformed, unstable matters and flows b. free intensities [=relative regions w/in a plasma field] c. nomadic singularities [=thresholds; bifurcators for phase changes] 2. Strata [=thickening, slowing down of flows of BwO/plane of consistency] a. Giving form to matters (1) imprisoning intensities [=forming discrete bodies out of plasma field] (2) locking singularities into systems of resonance/redundancy [forming “habits”] (3) producing molecules on body of earth and organizing them into molar aggregates b. Acts of capture (1) Operate by coding and territorialization (2) Judgment of God 3. But the earth flees, becoming destratified, decoded, deterritorialized B. Paired strata; (40b) 1. Stratum/substratum 2. Surface of stratification a. “more compact plane of consistency between two layers” b. = machinic assemblage [actualizing of self-organizing process] (1) Facing strata = interstratum (2) Facing BwO or plane of consistency = metastratum II. Key concept: Double articulation: God is a Lobster (40c-42a) A. Conceptual distinction of the two articulations: 1. First articulation: sedimentation a. Selection/deduction from unstable particle flows of metastable molecular units (= substances) b. Imposition of statistical order of connections and successions (= forms) 2. Second articulation: “folding” [cf. De Landa Thousand Years 290n82: should be “cementation”] a. Establishes functional structures ( = forms) b. Constructs molar compounds that actualize these structures (= substances) B. Double articulation is not same as substance / form distinction (41a) 1. Substance = formed matters a. Forms imply codes b. Substances as formed matters refer to territorialities 2. Each articulation has a code and a territory; thus each has substance and form 3. Each articulation has its type of multiplicity a. First articulation = supple, more molecular [NB: the relative term], merely ordered b. Second articulation = more rigid, more molar, organized (1) Overcoding (2) Centering, unification, totalization, integration, hierarchization, finalization [goal-orientation] 4. Intra stratum relations a. Between segments in same articulation: binary relations b. Between segments of both articulations: biunivocal relationships 5. “Structure”: sum total of these relations and relationships (but not the last word of the earth) C. Example of double articulation on the level of the organic stratum (41b) 1. Skipping diversity of other strata [but these are doubly articulated as well] 2. Making the body an organism is a phenomenon of double articulation on different levels a. Morphogenesis b. Cellular chemistry c. Genetic code III. New terminology introduced by the question of disciplinarity (42a-45a) A. Hjelmslev and his net: matter, content/expression, form/substance [nonlinguistic] (43a) 1. Matter = plane of consistency or BwO 2. Content = formed matters a. Substances = matters as chosen b. Form = order of choosing 3. Expression = functional structures (relative invariance); singing the glory of God a. Form = organization b. Substance = compound so established 4. First/second articulation is content/expression a. Isomorphism w/ reciprocal presupposition [=relation of content/expression] b. Always a real distinction [in the thing: scholastic terminology], but not pre-existing the relation c. By contrast, form/substance is only a mental or modal distinction B. Relativity of content/expression (44a) 1. They are only two variables of the function of stratification a. Vary from one stratum to another b. Intermingle c. Multiply and divide ad infinitum w/in same stratum 2. Articulations of content and expression are each double a. Intermediate states: levels, equilibriums, exchanges b. Form and substance of content as expression for other form and substance [at lower level] c. Thus each articulation is already double 3. Example on the organic stratum: proteins and nucleic acids 4. Resources necessary to make this conceptual machine work: a. Real distinction b. Reciprocal presupposition c. General relativism
The unity and diversity of a stratum relative to substances and forms (45a-57) IV. The question of the unity and diversity of a stratum (45a) A. Unity of composition of a stratum 1. Same molecular materials 2. Same substantial elements 3. Same formal relations B. Difference within stratum 1. Different molecules 2. Different substances 3. Different forms V. History of the question of unity and diversity of a stratum (45b-49a) A. Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire’s grandiose conception of stratification (45b) 1. Matter flowing through space: same on all strata 2. Processes of material relation a. Combustion: division on plane of consistency b. Electrification: constitutes strata 3. Specific unity of composition of organic stratum: the single abstract Animal; single machine a. Same molecular materials, elements (anatomical components), formal connections b. Different organic forms, organs, compound substances, molecules 4. Principle of unity and variety of organic stratum a. Isomorphism of form, but no correspondence b. Identity of elements or components, but no identity of compound substances B. Epistemological dialogue of the dead in puppet theater style (46a-47) 1. Geoffrey: isomorphism proved by “folding” 2. Cuvier: irreducible axes, types, branches 3. Vialleton: what is it that “folds”? 4. Geoffrey: need to consider “degrees of development or perfection” 5. Baer: degree of development is not same as type of form 6. Vialleton: must consider embryogenesis, which is not same as phylogenesis C. Politics of epistemology (47a) 1. Cuvier: man of power and terrain; Euclidean space 2. Geoffrey: prefigures nomadic man of speed; topology D. Darwin’s contributions to a science of multiplicites (47b-49) 1. Transformation of two factors explaining diversity w/in a stratum (47b) a. Degree of development — speeds, rates, coefficients, differential relations b. Types of forms — populations, packs, colonies, collectivities, populations 2. Forms as statistical results of populations (48a) a. Increased divergence of form leads to increased efficiency of occupation of a milieu b. Relationship of embryogenesis and phylogenesis is reverseds (1) Embryo does not match a form pre-established as fitting a milieu (2) But a population has range of relative forms to experiment with 3. Degrees of development as global and relative equilibriums or rates or differential relations (48b) a. Degrees of development are not pre-existent degrees of perfection on pre-established scale b. But differential relations / coefficients [btw selection and mutation] yielding advantages (1) Thus progress can be made through simplification, not just complexification (2) Thus populations and differential relations are productive of form (a) not individuals matching a pre-existent form (b) nor individuals progressing along a pre-existent continuum of perfection VI. Unity of composition of a stratum (49a) A. Materials B. Substantial elements (change in organization) 1. Materials furnish an exterior milieu (exterior to compounds, but w/in the stratum) 2. While the elements form an interiority a. Example of crystals b. Example of organic stratum
My plan is to finish the outline, copy it in pencil into my book, proceed to outline the differences between this account of genesis and DeLanda's (which from what I can tell consists in pointing out a few subtle distinctions DeLanda omits, and one which he demonstrates D&G to have missed, outlined above (Stratification: II.A.2.), and hopefully begin to actually write the body paragraphs of the DeLanda section, since it's due tomorrow, after all.)
N.B. Sorry about the stupid disorganization of the outline. You can find Protevi's outline easily through Google search if you're really that interested.
Major divisions of the plateau:
- •A General Theory of Stratification (40a-45)
- •The unity and diversity of a stratum relative to substances and forms (45a-57)
- •The variation between strata relative to content and expression (57a-64a)
- •Three problems [and a final distinction] remaining for Challenger (64b-72)
- •Summary/recapitulation and end of frame narrative (72a-74)
Framing narrative:
Professor Challenger's lecture, mixing geology and biology according to his simian disposition (40a). Denounced by the audience; Challenger's discipline named; Challenger introduces terminology of his friend Hjelmslev (42b). Challenger admits digression, but no way to distinguish digressive and nondigressive (49a). Most of the audience had left by end of second section. Challenger had changed: dreaming of program for computers, an axiomatic for stratification; addresses himself to memory only (57a). Challenger rushed by line of time on third (human) stratum (63a). Challenger wants to go faster and faster; but no one left. Challenger deterritorializing on the spot (64b). Challenger finishing up; suffocating; pincers; oozing fluid; animal voice (72). Flight of Challenger: leaving for the plane of consistency. Panic is creation (73a).
My plan is to finish the outline, copy it in pencil into my book, proceed to outline the differences between this account of genesis and DeLanda's (which from what I can tell consists in pointing out a few subtle distinctions DeLanda omits, and one which he demonstrates D&G to have missed, outlined above (Stratification: II.A.2.), and hopefully begin to actually write the body paragraphs of the DeLanda section, since it's due tomorrow, after all.)
N.B. Sorry about the stupid disorganization of the outline. You can find Protevi's outline easily through Google search if you're really that interested.
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