What the Problems Are

1. Nietzsche - genesis of values (minimally buttressed by an argument about the genesis of individuals--there is no atom which exists distinct from the forces that compose it, no good or noble person that can withhold from acting in a good or noble fashion)


2. Deleuze on Nietzsche - genesis of values and genesis of objects or forces (will-to-power as differentiator of forces)


3. DeLanda - genesis of individuals


4. Deleuze & Guattari - genesis of strata or territorialities (organisms)


5. Foucault - genesis of values of traditional historian




Me - genesis of each individual problem-solution set, and how this accounts for the transformations and appropriations of a theoretical entity called genealogy


Note: those scholars complaining against Foucault and Deleuze, who seem to be the target of this essay, operate with a misunderstanding of the problems dealt with, a misunderstanding of what counts as relevant and what counts as irrelevant, seeing only the actual text and calling for exhaustive exegesis about the text, they complain against Foucault and Deleuze for not simply repeating as they do, charging them with (gasp!) illicit scholarly method, but would they but attempt to penetrate beyond Nietzsche's words to see the incompleteness of his solutions, they would see how Deleuze has been all along attempting imperfect solutions to a genuinely philosophical problem Nietzsche had himself engaged with and recognized as beyond his anti-philosophical moral critiques:  that of the genesis of forces or forms, that which accounts for the very constitution of the universe in all its difference.


So, the basic task of this thesis seems to be in demonstrating an adequate understanding of Deleuze's ontological speculation so as to show some learned fools in universities (should they ever happen across this little essay) they ain't go no ideas, only lots of references, a job, and a lot of undue resentment against a seriously great philosopher with more rigor to his thought than they have.


This could, however, lead to a much more interesting project: that of trying to understand what accounts for all the specific differences in Deleuze's models for the genesis of form; and, assuming it to be true that he felt none of them to be sufficient solutions to the problem, how might these transformations point us toward a new solution to the problem of genesis? Perhaps Miguel de Beistegui has something to say toward this in his book Truth and Genesis, though probably some of the Speculative Realists or Object-Oriented Ontologists so hot these days have more interesting models to propose, since Beistegui's book looks more an exegetical than speculative affair.